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The McDonalds1 status may have been that of a "surety" or "indemnitor,"
but "guarantor" seems more accurate because the McDonalds' obligations arise out
of a separate instrument and were agreed to be secondary. For convenience, the
term "guarantor" is used herein. The incidents of the obligation, and i t s release, are functionally the same however i t is characterized.

4.

Whether there is a "reciprocal bargain" supporting an

agreement to furnish "security" for the payment of closing costs
on a loan if the funds are paid to third persons rather than for
closing of the loan,
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), UTAH
CODE ANN. § 70A-1-203, controls the "good faith and fair dealing"
question:
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.
UCC § 3-606, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-606, controls whether an
extension of the time for performance or impairment of collateral
effects a release of the guarantor:
Impairment of recourse or of collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of
rights . . . agrees to suspend the
right to enforce against such person
the instrument or collateral . . . or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by
or on behalf of the party or any person
against whom he has a right of recourse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from summary judgment entered against the
Defendants, foreclosing on their real property pledged, as security
for closing costs advanced to obtain a loan, and denying the
Defendants1 motion to dismiss on the theory that failure of
- 2 -

Plaintiffs to secure the loan amounted to a failure of consideration and disregard of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
A.

Course of Proceedings.
Following the filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint, Plaintiffs

moved for summary judgment and the Defendants moved to dismiss and
for summary judgment.

The competing motions were based upon depo-

sition testimony jointly submitted by the parties which forms
uncontroverted facts herein.
B.

Disposition in the Court Below.
The trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District

Judge, presiding, entered summary judgment for the Plaintiffs and
a judgment, decree of foreclosure and order of sale in the amount
of $505,261.12, inclusive of attorneys1 fees and interest at twenty
percent (20%) per annum.

Summary judgment was based upon a Memo-

randum Opinion, which constitutes the only findings of fact and
conclusions of law, concluding, inter alia, that it was "uncontroverted" that the $288,000.00 was "consideration" because "Defendant
understood that the proceeds of the loan which its trust deed and
note secured would be paid to another person to be used as closing
costs on the Currier loan."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in the matter at bar are bizarre, involving international intrigues over purported loan transactions in the billions
of dollars, the promise of millions of dollars in "payoffs" and
novices in high finance failing to apply ordinary commercial prac-

- 3 -

tices, moving the trial judge to observe that they read "much like
an epic poem of an odyssey with the end of a rainbow as its destination."

(Mem. Op. 3.)

The central characters in the "odyssey"

are sometimes comic in their ineptitude, reminiscent of "rug merchants" operating in league with field grade officers out of the
White House basement.

Nevertheless, as the trial judge also

observed, "the details of this saga are unimportant" and its
essentials really quite simple.
The facts are uncontroverted, and consist of deposition testimony submitted by joint agreement of the parties.

Pertinent por-

tions of that testimony are cited hereafter in the abbreviated

1/
s t y l e s e t out a t the margin.
A.

Essential Facts.
Simply s t a t e d , t h e c e n t r a l f a c t s involve an a l l e g e d loan of

b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s t o one Linda C u r r i e r

("Currier")

from an un-

named European or Arabian source — the "pot of gold" a l l u d e d t o
by Judge Murphy.

C u r r i e r ' s "jumbo" loan was t o have funded

smaller commercial l o a n s , i n c l u d i n g one in t h e amount of $3 m i l l i o n
t o the Defendant-Appellant McDonald B r o t h e r s , I n c .

("McDonalds"),

N e i l P . C h r i s t e n s o n d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 8, 1985, c i t e d a s "N. C h r i s t e n s o n
depo."
Robert C h r i s t e n s o n d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 8, 1985, c i t e d a s "R. C h r i s t e n s o n
depo."
David G a r r e t t d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 8, 1985, c i t e d a s " G a r r e t t d e p o . "
Howard McDonald d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 1 3 , 1985, c i t e d a s "H. McDonald d e p o . "
Stevenson McDonald d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 1 3 , 1985, c i t e d a s " S . McDonald
depo."
L a r r y Sorenson d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d November 14, 1983, c i t e d a s "Sorenson
depo. No. 1 . "
L a r r y Sorenson d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 7, 1985, c i t e d a s "Sorenson d e p o .
No. 2 . "
Dean Z a b r i s k i e d e p o s i t i o n d a t e d May 7, 1985, c i t e d a s " Z a b r i s k i e d e p o .
No. 2 . "
-

4

-

but was said to be contingent upon finding a source for $288,000.00
needed for "closing costs."
Larry Sorenson ("Sorenson") approached the Plaintiff-Appellees
Neil P. Christenson, et al. ("Christenson") and proposed that they
loan the $288,000.00.

Christenson was to be secured by a lien on

Currier's real property in California and be paid a $1 million
"bonus" together with interest on the $288,000.00.
agreed.

Christenson

Subsequent to Christenson1s agreement, and because apprais-

als on the Currier property were not then available, Christenson
requested that "additional security" be furnished.
3/
Sorenson then approached the McDonalds

with the proposal

that if they would pledge their real property as the additional
security for a ten-day period, to be resorted to only if Currier's
property proved insufficient, they would receive a $3 million loan
to fund their condominium project out of Currier's jumbo loan.
McDonalds did so by giving a note and trust deed to their property,
copies of which are attached as Appendix "A" and "B", respectively.
It is an uncontroverted fact, testified to by Christenson and
corroborated by the McDonalds and Sorenson, that the $288,000.00
and the security furnished by the McDonalds were agreed to be as
and for closing costs on the Currier loan.

The trial judge spe-

cifically found it. to b£ a fact that the loan which the McDonalds'
trust deed secured was "to be used as closing costs for the Currier
loan" (Mem. Op., 4) and that it "is undisputed that [the $288,000.00
was] for use as closing costs on the Currier loan."

(Mem. Op. 7.)

Sorenson in fact started on his "odyssey" in search for a loan for the
McDonalds. See p. 6, infra.

- 5 -

Christenson then dispatched its agent, Dave Garrett ("Garrett"),
to the offices of one Sasha Teplitz ("Teplitz") in Camden, New
Jersey to establish an escrow and from there to the Bahamas for the
closing.

No escrow was established, however, and the $288,000.00

was merely wired to the account of "Forex Monetary, Ltd." and never
applied to any closing.

Teplitz, Currier and Garrett then went to

the Bahamas where the closing was to have been held, but for unexplained reasons it never occurred.

The $288,000.00 was never

recovered and the McDonalds never received their $3 million loan.
Christenson foreclosed on Currier's property, which was insufficient to secure the $288,000.00 and accumulated interest, and
then brought this action to foreclose against the note and trust
deed furnished by the McDonalds as additional collateral.
B.

Details of the Transaction.
The "odyssey," to advert again to Judge Murphy's characteriz-

ation, with a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow as its end,
involves much more.
1.

The Role of Larry Sorenson.

It was an agreed fact that

all of the parties were introduced to Currier and her alleged loan
in the billions of dollars through the activities of Sorenson, who
acted in the capacity of a loan broker (though in fact he had no
qualifications to do so).
In 1981, the McDonalds contacted Sorenson and requested that
he assist them in finding a source for a $3 million loan to fund
Silverwood Estates.

1/

In the course of his efforts, Sorenson

4
H. McDonald depo. pp. 19-20, 22; S. McDonald depo. pp. 10-12, 19,
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learned that there was a woman in California by the name of Linda
Currier who claimed to have billions of dollars of "Arabian" or
"European" funds available to her for commercial loans, but needed
$288,000.00 for "closing costs".

Sorenson and his lawyer en-

gaged in a telephone conversation with Currier and Teplitz, in
which Teplitz explained that the $288,000.00 in closing costs had
already been incurred for the jumbo loan, and that he and Currier
were seeking a lender for the $288,000.00.

The telephone conver-

sation was taped, and subsequently used to induce the various parties to enter into the transaction, but the tape was never produced.
Sorenson and his attorney also went to Pasadena, California
and met with Currier.

Currier represented to them that the

V
proceeds of the jumbo loan would be used to fund smaller loans
and agreed to pay a bonus of $1 million if Sorenson could obtain

£/
a lender for the $288,000.00.
The testimony of Sorenson was that prior to this transaction
he had no experience as a loan broker, or as a banker or financier
or similar qualifications.
2.

The Advance of $288,000.00 by Christenson.

Sorenson was

then recommended or referred to Christenson "by one of my former
missionaries . . . Victor Juarez, who is an accountant down in Utah

£/
County."

Sorenson played the taped telephone conversation with

Sorenson depo. No. 2, p p . 11-14.
Z a b r i s k i e depo. No. 2, p p . 7 - 1 5 , 33-34; Sorenson depo. No. 2, p p . 1 7 - 2 1 .
7

Sorenson depo. No. 2, p . 1 1 .

g
Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 40; Zabriskie depo. No. 2, p. 14.
9
N. Christenson depo., p. 8. See also Sorenson depo. No. 1, p. 17.

- 7 -

Teplitz and Currier for Christenson.

At page 4 of the Memorandum

Opinion, the trial judge concluded that "thereafter Plaintiff
Security Funding agreed to loan $288,000.00 for closing costs if
such a loan was sufficiently collateralized."

Sorenson represented

that Christenson would obtain the $1 million "bonus" promised by
10/
Currier.
3.

Currier's Property was the Primary Security.

Sorenson

testified, and it is uncontroverted, that at the time Christenson
agreed to the loan he had not contacted the McDonalds about the
$288,000.00 or requested that they furnish any security.

"Linda

[Currier]'s property was supposed to be the first collateral"

11/

and the trust deed on McDonalds' property was obtained subsequently
as additional and secondary security:
Now the reason that was done, we felt at the
time that Linda's property, based on what she
told us, would cover it. But again, there was
no time to pull all your title searches and
everything on her property. So the reason we
put up Howard McDonald's property was to cover
in case what we were being told wasn't true.
(Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 40-41)
The Currier property was eventually given as security, by way
of a quit-claim deed, at the time of closing.
4.

Furnishing of Additional Collateral by the McDonalds.

"Sorenson then turned to Defendant McDonald[s] as the source of
additional collateral for the loan from [Christenson] for Currier's
closing costs." (Mem. Op. 4.)

It was an uncontroverted fact,

adopted by the trial judge as a finding, that "Sorenson represented

°R. Christenson depo. pp. 14-15;

N. Christenson depo. pp. 9-10.

Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 22, 40;

Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 69.

- 8 -

to McDonald[s] that by providing the collateral it would ultimately
obtain its loan from the proceeds of the Currier loan, plus a
12/
substantial bonus to be paid by Currier."
In response to those representations, the McDonalds gave their
note in the amount of $288,000.00 (though in fact nothing was paid
to the McDonalds) and their trust deed in favor of Security Funding
to secure it.

The trial judge also found it to be a fact that the

McDonalds "understood that the proceeds of the loan which its
trust deed and note secured would be paid to another person to be
used as closing costs for the Currier loan" (emphasis added) (Mem.
Op. 4) and repeated that conclusion at Mem. Op. 7.
5.

Misapplication of the $288,000.00.

Neil P. Christenson

testified that when he agree.d to put up the $288,000.00, he understood that the loan would close in a ten-day period and sent
Christenson1s representative, Dave Garrett, to New Jersey to handle
the closing:
A
It was proposed that the loan would go
down immediately and would be about a ten-day
period. And they felt that this could be done,
and that's why we sent our representative back,
Dave Garrett back east and into the Bahamas to
put down the loan, all in the same trip.
Q
So, he went to New Jersey and then to
the Bahamas?
A

Uh huh.

(N. Christenson depo., p. 10)

Sorenson also stressed that Christenson1s agent, Garrett, was to
make sure the funds were properly applied:
Q
Do you recall where the meeting with
Neil Christenson was?
12
Sorenson depo. No. 2, pp. 60-62;
S. McDonald depo., pp. 14, 29-30.
-

H. McDonald depo., pp. 16-17, 28-3 2;
q -

A

In his office.

Q

And who was there?

A
There was Neil Christenson, Dean Zabriski,
Don Winters, myself, and basically everybody in
Neil's office.
*

*

*

A
Yeah, we played them the tape, answered
some questions, and they asked us to leave the
room. We left the room, and they said that when
they
they asked us to come back in, that
basically they were going to put the money in
based on the fact that one member of their cffice
could go back to where the money was going to go
and make sure that everything was legitimate.
*

*

*

A
Yeah, Camden, New Jersey; that!s correct.
I can remember the house we were in.
Q
Do you recall who was supposed to go
tack to Camden, New Jersey with you from Security Funding?
*

*

*

A
Yeah, Dave Garrett.
No. 1, pp. 18-19)

(Sorenson depo.

It was thus uncontroverted that the $288,000.00 was to be held in
escrow:
Q
Did you feel that the $28 8,000.00 was
going to be held in escrow?
A
I felt that the $288,000.00 was going
to be held in escrow up to the time that everything was ready to close, which was to have been
a period of about three days.
*

*

*

Q
Were you concerned about the $288,000.00
escaping without the transaction being closed?
*

A

*

*

I expressed that concern to Mr. Teplitz
- 10 -

and
was in the room
and Dave Garrett was in
the room and Dean and Don Winters was in the room,
Q
press?

Okay. And what in essence did you exWhat did you say?

A
I basically said, and
said that there
should be some sort of proof of a closing before
any money's released*

Q
So, was it your understanding at that
time the money would be expended or held in
escrow?
A
It was still my understanding that for
a period of time the money would be held in escrow.
Q

What period of time?

A
Twenty-Four to 48 hours.
No. 2, pp. 25-28)
An escrow was never established, however.

(Sorenson depo.

Christenson, after

conferring with Garrett, simply transmitted the $288,000.00 to
13/
"Sasha Teplitz1 accounts,"

14/

before there had been any closing.

The foregoing facts relative to the role of Garrett and
the failure to establish an escrow are uncontroverted, although
not referred to in any way in the Memorandum Opinion.
6.

The Trip to the Bahamas for the "Closing".

The pot of

gold at the end of a rainbow alluded to by Judge Murphy never materialized.

After the payment of $28 8,000.00 to the account of

"Forex Monetary, Ltd." in New Jersey, Teplitz, Garrett, Currier
and others took a trip to the Bahamas where the "closing" was to
have occurred.

Garrett and Currier stayed there for several days,

13

Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 26.

14

Garrett depo., pp. 24-25.
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paying their expenses with Currier's credit card, while she gave
a series of excuses why the loan never closed.

Finally, they re-

turned to the United States without the jumbo loan.

What happened

to the $288,000.00 has never been disclosed.
7.

Renegotiation of the Currier Transaction.

Christenson

subsequently agreed with Currier, long after the promised closing
had failed to occur, to extend the time for her performance beyond
the ten days in which the McDonalds were told the transaction
would be completed.

Christenson substituted warranty deeds on

Currier's properties as part of that transaction for the quitclaim deeds originally obtained and as an inducement Currier increased Christenson's promised bonus to One Million Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000.00).

The McDonalds were not informed

of the new warranty deeds, or the promise of an increase in the
"bonus," until about a year after the date of their note and
trust deed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The failure of Christenson to establish an escrow, and

see that the $288,000.00 was applied to closing of the Currier
loan, was the actual "cause" of the loss.

The failure of Chris-

tenson to act fairly and in good faith in that regard therefore
bars its claim under the doctrine of "unclean hands."
B.

Christenson had a duty of good faith and fail dealing

with respect to the McDonalds under UCC § 1-203, which was
breached by the failure to see that the reasonable expectations
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of the McDonalds were satisfied.

"Bad faith" for purposes of

UCC § 1-203 is satisfied by inaction with respect to establishment
of an escrow or assuring that the $288,000.00 was applied to
closing the Currier loan.

Christenson was a "fiduciary" in that

regard, or at least bound to act with honesty and competence.
C.

The promise to pay the closing costs on the Currier loan,

not the payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson, was the "consideration" for the McDonalds1 note and trust deed.

The holding of the

trial court that the mere giving of value to a third person was
"consideration" is therefore in error.

It was further necessary

that such payment be as and for the "bargain" of the McDonalds,
viz., that the closing costs on the Currier loan, from which the
McDonalds were to obtain financing, be paid.

Otherwise, the nec-

essary reciprocal relation of promise and inducement is not present.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71.
D.

Extension of Currier's time for payment, increasing the

"bonus" payable to Christenson, and substitution of new collateral,
without the knowledge or consent of the McDonalds, effects a
release of the obligation of the McDonalds as a guarantor.

UCC §

3-606.
E.

Costs awarded for duplication of depositions previously

conducted by predecessor counsel were improper.

ARGUMENT
The facts reveal a fairly common scam, familiar to Utahns in
recent years as an "advance fee loan scheme."
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Teplitz is actually

an alias for "Sidney Litt", who has since been convicted of similar
schemes and at the time of trial was serving time in the federal
15/
penitentiary in Kentucky.
This Court's task, therefore, is to
determine who, among the common victims of a fraudulent scheme,
must bear the loss.
The Memorandum Opinion of the distinguished trial judge
approached that task with a preoccupation over the questions of
whether Sorenson was agent for or "acting on behalf of" the
McDonalds and the fact that Stevenson McDonald made a correction
in his deposition (as the Rules of Procedure accord him the right
to do) to clarify the quality of Sorensonfs status. (Mem. Op. 2-3.)
Both of those matters are, we submit, irrelevant.

There was no

finding that Sorenson was agent for or "acting on behalf of" the
McDonalds in his contacts with Christenson and it would be of
little consequence whether Sorenson was agent for or acting on
behalf of the McDonalds when he first contacted Currier.

The Mem-

orandum Opinion correctly acknowledges that the changes in the
deposition were of no consequence.

The proper question is the

terms of the McDonalds1 agreement.

The agreement is the same,

whether entered into directly or through Sorenson acting as agent,
and the $288,000.00 is "consideration" only as and to the extent
that it was paid in accordance with McDonalds1 "bargain".
Whether Sorenson was McDonalds1 agent is also of no consequence to whether Christenson acted in good faith under the agree-

Judicial notice of these matters may be taken from Criminal Case No.
8200153, United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Litt
was indicted for mail fraud, 7 counts, wire fraud, 9 counts, failure to file
federal income tax, 3 counts, interstate transportation of stolen property, 6
counts, and other crimes, convicted and incarcerated at Lexington, Kentucky.
-

1 A

-

ment.

There is no claim that the McDonalds, acting directly or

through Sorenson, excused any performance that the law requires,
or could do so.
POINT I
Christenson1s Cause of the Loss, By Failing
to Establish a Proper Escrow, Amounts to "Unclean Hands."
As in any commercial dispute, particularly one involving covictims of a fraud, it is important to consider the actual Cause
of the loss.

The Memorandum Opinion never reached that question,

having concluded —

erroneously, we submit —

no "duty," vis-a-vis, the McDonalds.

that Christenson had

This Court need not pause

in that regard, however, for the stipulated evidence conclusively
establishes Christenson1s responsibility for the loss.
A.

There Was Neither an Escrow Nor a "Closing."
The evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and acknowledged in

the Memorandum Opinion, that Christenson was to apply the
$288,000.00 to the closing of the Currier loan and to establish an
escrow to accomplish the payment of the "closing costs:"
A It was proposed that the loan would go
down immediately and would be about a ten-day
period. And they felt tnat this could be done,
ana that 1 s why we sent our representative back,
Dave Garrett back east and into the Bahamas to
put down the loan, all in the same trip.
(Emphasis added.) (N. Christenson depo., p. 10)
The uncontroverted evidence is that it was Christenson1s duty to
establish the escrow.
Q Did you feel that the $288,000.00 was
going to be held in escrow?
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A I felt that the $288,000.00 was going
to be held in escrow up to the time that everything was ready to close, which was to have
been a period of about three days.
*

*

*

Q And what was your understanding as to
who the escrow was?
A I was -- it was my understanding that
the escrow account was Sasha Teplitz' accounts.
Q You felt that Sasha Teplitz was acting
as an escrow agent?
A

Yes.
*

Q
to do?

*

*

What, specifically, were they going

A They were going to place $288,000 into
the hands of Sasha Teplitz after they sent somebody back and confirmed that they felt that
things were as they said they were on the tape.
(Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 25-27, 34.) (Emphasis
added.)
Christenson failed entirely in that obligation.

The evidence is

clear, and uncontroverted that the $288,000.00 was never placed in
an escrow of any description:
Q
What kind of an account was set up to
receive those funds?
A

I don't know what kind of account it was.

Q
You didn't ever go to the bank and check
that out? Did you see any escrow agreement with
the bank?
A

No.

(Garrett depo., p. 15.)

Neither did Christenson undertake to see that the $2 88,00 0.00 was
applied to "closing" of the Currier loan:
Q
Nassau?

And what was the purpose in going to
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A
We were invited by Linda [Currier] to
go to the closing of the loan.
Q
Nassau?
A

So, you expected the loan to close in
Yes.

Q
You also expected that the $288,000,00
would be expended before the closing of the loan?
A

Uh huh.

Q

Why didn't it happen?

A

I have no idea.

Q

Did she give you any ideas then?

A
She [Currier] spoke of delays for
various reasons which I can't remember. I
don't know why it didn't close.

Q

Did you take any action when it didn't
close timely in Nassau?
A
No. (Emphasis added.)
pp. 22, 24-25.)

(Garrett depo.,

In fact, the money was not even paid to Currier, Teplitz, or anyone remotely connected with the bargain of the McDonalds:
Q
The money was disbursed somehow to
this bank in New Jersey to an account that you
can't really identify now?
A

I Know the name of the account.

Q

You say you do?

A

Un huh.

Q

What kind of an account was that?

Forex Monetary Ltd.

A
Maybe we're not communicating. I
don't know what kind of a bank account it was.
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Q
Was it a savings account, an escrow
account, a trust account?
A
p. 21.)

I don't have any idea.

(Garrett depo.,

The eventual cause of the loss of the $288,000.00, therefore,
was the failure of Christenson, acting directly and through its
agent, Garrett, to see that adequate escrow arrangements were entered into or other arrangements made to assure that the $288,000.00
was applied to the closing of the Currier loan:
Q
Who directed Security Funding as to
where to send their $288,000?
A
Dave Garrett was on one end of the phone
in Camden and somebody was on the end of the phone
up here. And to the best of my recollection,
Sasha was telling Dave Garrett where the money
was supposed to go and how it was supposed
to be wired.
(Sorenson depo., p. 17/)
Indeed, merely wiring the $288,000.00 to Forex Monetary, Ltd.
—

an apparent stranger —

does not satisfy the requirements of an

"escrow":
For the instrument to operate as an escrow there
must be:
(a) An agreement as to the subject matter
and delivery of the instrument;
(b)

There must be a third-party depository;

(c) There must be delivery of the instrument
to a third party conditioned upon the performance
of some act on the happening of this event; and
(d) The relinquishment by the guarantor.
Menkis v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Association,
356 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487-8 (N.Y. 1974).
Christenson now seeks to impose its loss resulting from its
failure to establish a proper escrow or to properly apply the
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money on the McDonalds.
B.

Christenson*s Claim is Barred by "Unclean Hands."
The doctrine in pari delicto, or unclean hands, has applica-

tion here.

It is familiar doctrine in equity that even "in a case

of equal or mutual fault . . . the condition of the [defending
party] is the better one" and "the law will leave the case as it
finds it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).

The concept

is stated, in terms appropriate to the facts herein, at Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933):
This court has declared: "It is a principle
in chancery, that he who asks relief must
have acted in good faith. The equitable
powers of this court can never be exerted in
behalf of one who has acted fraudulently or
who by deceit or any unfair means has gained
an advantage. To aid a party in such a case
would make this court the abetter of iniquity."
The unclean hands and in pari delicto maxims operate against
conduct which is contrary to the dictates of good conscience and
fair dealing.

2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 92-94 (5th ed. 1941).

For a case arising in Utah applying the doctrine by way of dicta
to a mortgage foreclosure and issues of "good faith" see Deseret
Apartments v. United States, 250 F.2d 457, 458 (10th Cir. 1957).
This Court has applied the doctrine in a case involving failure
of consideration.
(dicta).

Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah 1982)

C£. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976).

The

doctrine has particular application where, as here, the unfair conduct of the claimant results in a direct injury to the defendant.
Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1 (Utah 1961).
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Analogy to a mortgage transaction for the purchase of a home
is apt.

Would such a commercial borrower be obligated if the

lending institution failed to establish a proper escrow and applied
the construction money to the wrong party?

Could the hands of

such a lender, having failed to exercise care to see the money
properly applied, be considered "clean"?

We submit that the Memo-

randum Opinion errs in concluding that such an improper payment,
in this case to the order of Teplitz rather than for the closing
of a loan, amounts to "consideration" in the legal sense (see
Point III, infra) or was "good faith" in any sense of that term
(see Point II, infra).
POINT II
The Trial Court Erroneously Excused Christenson
of its Legal "Duty" of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The cryptic holding that "there is no evidence to support any
claim of a duty owed by any Plaintiff to Defendant" (Mem, Op. 7)
is error —

as a matter of law, for it ignores well established

principles of lender's liability.

The further holding that "such

a duty is a necessary predicate to Defendant's negligence counterclaim," coupled with the uncontroverted fact that Christenson
failed to establish a proper escrow for the $288,000.00, compels
the conclusion that Christenson1s conduct was the actual cause of
the loss.
A.

Contract Law Imposes Firm Duties Between Contracting Parties.
It is error to assume, as the Memorandum Opinion does, that a

lender has no duty of good faith and fair dealing to a guarantor
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such as the McDonalds.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 205 plainly

declares otherwise:
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.
To the same effect, UCC Section 1-203, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-203,
declares that "[e]very contract or duty within this act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."

The

UCC provision has special application, for the note given by the
McDonalds to support the trust deed was subject to the UCC provisions.
This Court has implicitly recognized the duty defined by the
Restatement and the UCC.

Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah

Security Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985) (dicta, defense
waived under UCC § 9-207).

See also, Clayton v. Crossroads Equip-

ment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (punitive damages for bad
faith foreclosure on a combine during harvest season).
1.
—

Facts Concerning Breach of Christenson1s "Duty" are Agreed

and Determined by the Trial Court.

Stressing that the $288,000.00

"would be paid to another person" (Mem. Op. 4) and "that [McDonald]
knew and understood that [the $288,000.00] would be paid, not to it,
but to someone else" (Mem. Op. 6-7) fails to explain away the duty
Christenson owed to the McDonalds, or even deal with the elements
of that duty.
Certainly the McDonalds knew and understood that the funds
Christenson paid would go to a third person.

That knowledge is

fundamental to being a surety, indemnitor or guarantor.
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The

McDonalds1 expectation, nevertheless, was that their property was
pledged only if the funds being guaranteed were applied to closing
the Currier loan so that they could get their $3 million loan.
It was, in fact, agreed, and found as a fact by the trial judge,
that the McDonalds pledged their property only in the expectation
of receiving financing from Currier's jumbo loan.

Indeed, each

of the foregoing holdings relative to payment to a third person
are coupled with the finding that the funds were "to be used as
closing costs for the Currier loan" (Mem. Op. 4) and were "for use
as closing costs on the Currier loan."

(Mem. Op. 7.)

It was agreed, further, that Christenson would undertake to
see that the $288,000.00 was properly applied by establishing an
escrow.

Christenson dispatched its agent, Garrett, to Camden,

New Jersey, and then to the Bahamas for that purpose, but the
agreed fact is that rather than establish an escrow Christenson
simply wired the $288,000.00 directly to an apparent stranger to
the transaction.
2.

Christenson Failed to Act with "Good Faith".

The meaning

of "good faith," appropos the inaction of Christenson in establishing an escrow or applying the $288,000.00 to a "closing," is defined at RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 205, comments a and d:
Comment a. Meanings of "good faith."
" I ] [G]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness
to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the
other party . . . .
*

*

*

Comment d. Good faith performance . . . bad
faith may be overt or may consist of inaction,
and fair dealing may require more than honesty.
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Christenson1s conduct, vis-a-vis the escrow and closing, plainly
frustrated the McDonalds1 "justified expectations11 under the contract, and was the epitome of "inaction."

Christenson1s agent,

Garrett, made clear that he was given no instructions that would
satisfy Christenson1s obligation of good faith, and was unqualified
to do so even if he had:
A
We were looking for—we didnft know
what we were looking for in terms of verification. We're very unsophisticated at this type
of thing.
0
What was your specific charge from Mr.
Christenson before going back there? What did
he tell you to do?
A

Check it out.
*

*

*

Q
Okay. Then I'm interested in finding
out what you were looking for in Camden, New
Jersey.
A
I didn't know what I was looking for.
I was going back to check it out as best I could.
Being unsophisticated and to give ourselves some
degree of assurance that what we were doing was
going to work. (Garrett depo. pp. 18-19.)
Garrett's appraisal of his lack of ability was certainly accurate.
He is a high school dropout (who enrolled at BYU for a short time
16/
on the recommendation of his Mission President, Neil Christenson).
Moreover, Christenson failed to discharge its duty entirely and
merely wired the $288,000.00 to a stranger named "Forex Monetary,
Ltd.":

Q And those [two promissory notes]
$288,000, i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?
A

That's correct.

' G a r r e t t d e p o . , p . 6.
-
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total

Q
Was that amount then wired to [the account of Forex Monetary, Ltd., at] the Bank of
New Jersey in Camden?
A

Yes.

Q

Who authorized that wire?

A

Neil Christenson.

(Garrett depo., p. 11.)

Thus Garrett was sent to Camden, New Jersey, to assure that
17/
the transaction was "legitimate,"
but when he got there he —
and Neil Christenson —

displayed faithlessness and lack of regard

for the justified expectations of those they had contracted with.
They resolved to go ahead with the transaction, even though they
doubted its legitimacy, because they believed any loss would fall,
not on themselves, but on the McDonalds.
Q
Did you have some suspicions about
the loan? Did you think it was worth doing?
A
Oh, we were, I think, through the whole
process we were unsure of the loan. I think you
always are. But because we considered ourselves
fully protected with collateral, we made the
loan.
*

*

*

Q
So, what triggered in your mind that it
was all right to tell Neil Christenson everything's fine, send money, or something to that
effect?
A
It was really triggered on both ends.
The primary factor for Security Funding was the
loan properly collateralized. Since we had
collateral with Howard [McDonald] and since the
collateral was forthcoming with Mountain West,
and in order to further secure our interest,
Currier volunteered her property, we could see
no reason not to make the loan. (Garrett depo.,
pp. 13, 16.)

Garrett depo., p. 12.
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It is important to observe that Neil F. Christenson was the
party on the other "end" of the telephone, and he therefore acted
directly to shift the burden for loss to the McDonalds.

It would

therefore be hard to deny that Christenson disregarded its duty
of "good faith" or satisfied the obligation of "fair dealing" in
relation to the escrow and closing.

The agreed evidence is that

Christenson did not even establish an escrow and there was never
a closing.
Indeed, Christenson did not even identify the account to which
the $288,000.00 was wired, and did not care because Neil Christenson
believed the loss would fall on the McDonalds.

CE. UCC § 9-207(1),

UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-207(1):
A secured party must use reasonable care
in the custody and preservation of collateral in his possession . . . .
This Court observed in the Clayton case, supra, at 112 8,
that
[T]he obvious purpose of requiring that a
secured party act in good faith is to impose the basic obligation of fair dealing,
and to protect the purchaser from the mere
whim or caprice of the secured party.
That obligation was callously disregarded by Christenson.
3.
texts.

"Lender's Liability" is Imposed in Numerous Related ConOther jurisdictions have given literal effect to UCC §

1-203's duty of good faith dealing in all contracts, e.g., Cohen
v. Rattnoff, 147 Cal. App.3d 321 (1983):
In every contract there is an implied covenant
that neither party shall do anything that will
have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits
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of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. . . .
This covenant not only imposes upon each contracting party the duty to refrain from doing
anything which would render performance of the
contract impossible by any act of his own, but
also the duty to do everything that the contract
presupposes that he will do to accomplish its
purpose.
As the Illinois Court has held:
Good faith between contracting parties requires
the party vested with contractual discretion to
exercise it reasonably, and he may not do so
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the
parties. (Citations omitted.) Carrico v. Delp,
490 N.E.2d 972, 976 (111. 1986).
"Good faith" requires "decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or enforcement" of a contract.

R. Eisenberg, Good Faith

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
This Court has applied that standard in Williamson v. Wanlass,
545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976) to bar enforcement of strict forfeiture
provisions in a contract after the obligee accepted and retained
late payments.

See also, 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th

Cir. 1985) (negligent misrepresentation in a loan commitment);
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)
(lender liable for change in policy re. extension of credit);
Brown v. Avemco Investment Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979)
(due on sale clause unenforceable if repayment is unimpaired);
Skeels v^ Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964) (foreclosure on dealers automobiles without notice and in
disregard of oral credit commitments refused); Yanktown Production
Credit Ass f n. v. Larsen, 365 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1985) (bad faith
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failure to honor loan commitment); First National Bank v.
Twombley, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (refusal to convert principal
payment into an installment loan); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674
P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) (repossession without notice);

State

National Bank v. Farahh Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.
App. 1984).
The implications of the Memorandum Opinion are shocking.
Does the trial judge mean to say, really, that the mere payment of
$288,000.00 by Christenson, to anyone and for any purpose, would
satisfy the obligation of good faith and fair dealing simply because the McDonalds knew it would be paid to a third person?

That

is the necessary consequence of the holding, precisely.
B.

Christenson had the Duty of a "Fiduciary".
The Memorandum Opinion's casual holding of "no evidence to

support any claim of a duty owed by any plaintiff to defendant"
(Mem. Op. 7) also ignores the McDonalds1 claim that Christenson
"took upon themselves a fiduciary obligation . . . and violated
18/
their fiduciary obligations."
In fact, the circumstances of the
McDonalds1 delivery of trust deeds to the McDonald Bros.1 property
Christenson, to secure closing costs on a loan and the promise of
$3 million in financing, created a classic

"resulting trust."

See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 404:
Where Resulting Trust Arises. A resulting
trust arises where a person makes or causes
to be made a disposition of property under
circumstances which raise an inference that
18
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Defendant's
Motion for Dismissal and Summary Judgment, p. S.
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he does not intend that the person taking
or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest therein, unless the
inference is rebutted or the beneficial
interest is otherwise effectively disposed
of.
Christenson1s role in handling the escrow and closing was
not unlike that of a real estate agent or broker in closing the
sale of a home or business.

This Court has variously held such

agents to be fiduciaries, in the classic sense, Hopkins v. Wardley
Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1980); Latimer v^ Katz, 508 P.2d
542, 544 (Utah 1973); Holland v. Moreton, 353 P.2d 989, 995 (Utah
1960); Reese v^ Harper, 329 P.2d 410 (Utah 1958), or at least
"required to meet standards of 'honesty, integrity, truthfulness,
reputation and competency.1" (Emphasis added.)
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).

Dugan v. Jones,

Under either formulation of the

standard, Christenson had a duty and its failure to establish an
escrow or pay the $288,000.00 over at a "closing" failed to measure up to the requisite "competence."
POINT III
The Memorandum Opinion Errs on the Issue
of "Consideration"
The most basic and fundamental error of the trial court is
its conclusion concerning "consideration" at page 6 of the Memorandum Opinion:
[T]he evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff
Security Funding provided good and adequate
consideration for the trust deed and note by
payment of $288,000.00. The evidence is
undisputed that Defendant knew and understood
that this consideration would be paid, not to
it, but to someone else . . . .
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The explicit assumption of the Memorandum Opinion, therefore, is
that the payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson was "consideration"
in the legal sense.

That conclusion, vis-a-vis "consideration,"

is incorrect according to the agreed facts, and in error as a
matter of law to the extent that it ignores the "bargained for"
element of contract consideration.

Far from being "undisputed,"

the McDonalds vigorously argued that there was no "consideration"
in their motion for summary judgment, and again in their motion
for reconsideration.
The "consideration" necessary to support Christenson1s claim
is defined at RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71:
§ 71.

Requirement of Exchange; Type of Exchange.

(1) To constitute consideration, a performance
or a return promise must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.
See also 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 2, 2A (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 10 (1963).
The $288,000.00 paid to Forex Monetary, Ltd., at the order of
Teplitz, was "consideration" only if it was applied in the manner
and for the purposes for which the McDonalds agreed to furnish
security.
A.

Clearly it was not.

A "Reciprocal Bargain" is Essential to "Consideration."
The consideration issue is properly resolved by looking to

the note the trust deed was to secure.

If the note was without

consideration, so is the trust deed, for this Court has declared
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that " . . . where there is no debt, there can be no mortgage."
Thomas v^_ Ogden State Bank, 80 Utah 138, 13 P.2d 636, 640 (1932).
The note in the amount of $28 8,000.00, attached hereto as
Exhibit "A", recites that it was given "for value received."

The

"value" contemplated was plainly not the receipt of $288,000.00,
for Christenson agreed that no monies were ever paid to the
19/
McDonalds.
The "consideration" plainly was the promise of
Christenson to pay the closing costs on the Currier loan, so that
the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million financing.,

Just as

plainly, if the promise failed, then the note was without consideration and the trust deed securing it was unenforceable.
It is variously stated and universally held that the mere
fact that a person gave something of value, whether cash or a
promise, does not amount to consideration unless it is regarded
as such by both parties.

"[N]othing can be treated as a consid-

eration. . . that is not intended as such by the parties."
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 100 at p. 337.

See also, Fire Ins. Assn.

v. Wickham,141 U.S. 564, 579 (1891):
Thus in Philpot v. Gruninger, 81 U.S. 14 Wall.
570, 577 [20: 743, 744], it is stated that
"nothing is consideration that is not regarded
as such by both parties." To constitute a
valid agreement there must be a meeting of minds
upon every feature and element of such agreement,
of which the consideration is one. The mere
presence of some incident to a contract which
might under certain circumstances be upheld as
a consideration for a promise, does not necessarily make it the consideration for the promise
in that contract. To give it that effect it
must have been offered by one party and accented
by the other as one element of the contract. In
Kilpatrick v. Muirhead, 16 Pa. 117, it was said
that "consideration, like every other part of a
contract, must be the result of agreement; the
9N. Christenson depo., p. 19.
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parties must understand and be influenced to the
particular action by something of value or convenience and inconvenience recognized by all of
them as the moving cause. That which is a mere
fortuitous result following accidentally from
an arrangement, but in no degree promoting the
actors to it, is not to be esteemed a legal consideration. "
See also, 59 CJS Mortgages §§ 87 and 141.

The rule has been

applied in various contexts related to the facts herein.

In

Silver Waters Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1965) a mortgage
was held unenforceable where the orginal mortgagee had failed to
make agreed-upon advances to the mortgagor.

In Benson v. Andrews,

138 Cal.2d 123, 292 P.2d 39 (1955), a note and mortgage were held
unenforceable because the original mortgagee had failed to perform
its promise to complete construction.

The trial court thus erred

in assuming that the mere payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson
amounted to "consideration", for it was also necessary that the
$288,000.00 be paid as and for the promise to pay the closing costs
on the Currier loan.

As the North Dakota court said in construing

notes given to secure the payment of bail:
The notes were not to be paid as a consideration for his promise [to furnish bail],
but only on the contingency that he advanced
monies and suffered loss on account of such
bail. . . and under this record such contingency never arose. Grebe v. Swords, 149
N.W. 126, 129 (N.D. 191TT
The "promise" decidedly was not that Christenson would pay
$288,000.00 to Forex Monetary, Ltd., to the order of Teplitz or to
some "third party" —

it just as plainly was that the closing

costs on the Currier loan would be paid so that the McDonalds
could secure their $3 million loan.

Indeed, the Memorandum Opinion

itself recites that "Sorenson represented to Defendant McDonald
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that by providing the collateral it would ultimately obtain its
loan from the proceeds of the Currier loan . . . ." (Mem. Op. 4)
and that the note and trust deed was "to be used as closing costs
for the Currier loan."

Id.

The promise failed entirely, for "the Currier loan was never
consummated."

(Mem. Op. 5.)

promised $3 million.

The McDonalds never received their

Mere recitation that the $288,000.00 was to

be paid to "someone else" (Mem. Op. p. 7) does not avoid that defect, for the "promise" —
—

acknowledged by the Memorandum Opinion

was that it was to be "use[d] as closing costs on the Currier

loan."

IcJ. Unless and until that promise was satisfied there was

no consideration.
Comment b. to RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71 explains the "bargained for" concept in terms appropos this case:
b. "Bargained f o r . " . . . the consideration
and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of
motive or inducement: the consideration induces the making of the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration.
The giving of something by Christenson, no matter how valuable,
and even if given in good faith reliance on McDonalds" promise,
is not consideration for the promise of the McDonalds unless the
reciprocal relation of motive and inducement are present.

Comment

b. further explains:
. . .[I]t is not enough that the promise
induces the conduct of the promisee or that
the conduct of the promisee induces the
making of the promise; both elements must
be present, or there is no bargain.
Expressed in terms of the Restatement, McDonalds1 promise, induced
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by Sorenson's solicitation, plainly was not to be obligated for
$288,000.00 if Christenson paid that amount to some third party.
Christenson1s motive may have been that McDonalds be so obligated,
but there was no reciprocal relation of McDonalds' promise to that
expectation.

The promise of payment of the closing costs on

Currier f s loan so that a $3 million loan would become available to
the McDonalds was plainly the inducement to McDonalds1 promise, and
the only performance that would satisfy the reciprocal relationship necessary to the "bargained for" element of consideration was
(1) the payment of the closing costs on the jumbo loan so that
(2) there could be a $3 million loan to the McDonalds.
B.

The Facts Recited in the Memorandum Opinion Repudiate
"Consideration."
Indeed, the conclusion of the Memorandum Opinion is irrecon-

cilable with the facts recited in the Memorandum Opinion itself.
At page 4 the Memorandum Opinion recites that "Defendant understood
that the proceeds of the loan which its Trust Deed and Note secured
would be paid to another person to b£ used as closing costs for
the Currier loan."

(Emphasis added.)

Again at page 6 the trial

court observed that "[t]he evidence is undisputed that Defendant
knew and understood that this consideration would be paid, not to
it, but to someone else for use as closing costs on the Currier
loan."

(Bnphasis added.)

The trial court was certainly correct

in both instances -- but the Memorandum Opinion errs in that it
fails to take account that the proceeds of the McDonalds1 Trust
Deed and Note were not used "as closing costs for the Currier
loan," but were misapplied to other purposes never contemplated
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—

by Christenson or Sorenson or contracted for by the McDonalds,
The trial court apparently assumed that because it was undisputed that something of value passed from Christenson, it was
also "undisputed" that Christenson. gave "good and adequate consideration" (Mem. Op. 6). To the contrary, the conclusion that
there was "consideration" was vigorously disputed during the proceedings on Christenson1s motion.

In that regard the trial court

failed to consider that such value was not "consideration," at
least with respect to the promise of the McDonalds, because it
was not "bargained for."

That defect in the Memorandum Opinion's

reasoning was forcefully presented to the trial judge in a Motion
for Reconsideration with a supporting brief, but was denied without comment.
The facts in that regard are clear and uncontroverted.

The

testimony of Stevenson McDonald, relied upon in the Memorandum
Opinion, was as follows:
Q
What did they represent they were
going to do with the documents [viz., the note
and trust deed]?
A
To use them for what they were purported for.
Q

What was your understanding?

A
That it was to secure the closing
costs for the loan that they were trying to get.
Q
Did you note where they were getting
the closing costs from?
A
The Security Funding, I guess, was
where they were going to get to do the
Q
What did you hope to gain by giving up
this trust deed note and trust deed and escrow
agreement into Robert Laboreaux1 possession?
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A

It was to get that loan consummated.

Q

Which loan?

A The one that they were promising that
they were going to get closed, where the funds
were coming from. (Emphasis added.) (S. McDonald
depo., p. 17.)
Neil Christenson agreed that the $288,000.00 was given only as and
for closing costs for the loan:
A
For an investment of $288,000.00,
which they said would constitute closing costs
for the loan. They would provide a bonus and
an interest factor.
Q

What kind of bonus were they speaking of?

A
They were talking about a million dollar
bonus of which a portion would be shared with
other parties.
Q
Were you to get your $288,000.00 back or
was that to be spent?
A
As I remember, the $288,000.00 would
have been returned plus the million dollar bonus.
*

*

*

Q
And what was your understanding as to how
long they would have your money, the $288,000.00?
A
It. was proposed that the loan would
go down immediately and would be about a tenday period . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
(N. Christenson depo., pp. 9-10.)
The position of the McDonalds is precisely like that of one
who negotiates for any consumer loan, such as one for the financing
of a home previously alluded to.

The lending institution may not

claim that it gave "consideration" for a note and mortgage, trust
deed, or similar instrument merely because it gave something of
value to a third person, such as a materialman who may have misapplied the funds.

The bargain of the purchaser which forms its
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promise, like that of the McDonalds herein for the payment of
closing costs on the jumbo loan, is for a loan for the purchase
of a home.

If the lending institution fails to see that promise

performed, through failure to maintain a proper escrow, then there
is a failure of consideration and no contract.
C.

Christenson1s Commitment of $288,000 Preceded the McDonalds'
Note.
Indeed, but a moment's reflection is necessary to demonstrate

that the McDonalds' Note and Trust Deed could not have been given
for the mere promise of Christenson to pay $288,000.00 to some
undefined third party.

It is uncontroverted that Christenson

agreed to pay the $288,000.00 prior to any contract with the
McDonalds:
Q
to do?

What, specifically, were they going

A
They were going to place $288,000 into
the hands of Sasha Teplitz . . . .
Q
At that point, you hadn't contacted
McDonalds about pledging their property for
security, had you?
A
Not when I went to Neil first time, no.
(Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 34.)
POINT IV
Change of Currier's Primary Obligation
Released the McDonalds as Guarantors
It is an uncontroverted fact, acknowledged in the* Memorandum
Opinion, that subsequent to the time when the Currier loan failed
to close, and after the ten-day period in which it was represented
to the McDonalds that the entire transaction would be completed,
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Christenson renegotiated the transaction with Currier.

The rights

and obligations as between Currier and Christenson were thereby
significantly altered, including by extending the time for performance by Currier beyond the ten days originally contemplated and
increasing the "bonus" that was payable to Christenson from $1 million to $1.5 million.

The interim collateral furnished by Mountain

West was also released by Christenson.
It is familiar law in that regard that a guarantor such as the
McDonalds is released from liability by such an extension of the
time for payment or such unilateral changes in the primary obligation:
Subject to some exceptions, the general rule
is that a valid agreement between a guarantee
and a principal for an extension of time for
payment or performance by the principal, for
a definite period, without the consent or
ratification of the guarantor, releases the
guarantor from the obligations of his guaranty,
even though he is not in fact injured by the
extension. 38 CJS Guaranty § 75a,
As regards the McDonalds1 trust deed note, Section 3-6 06 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-606) codifies the
proposition:
Impairment of recourse or of collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a)

without express reservation of rights
. . . agrees to suspend the right to
enforce aqainst such person the instrument or collateral . . . or

(b)

unjustifiably impairs any collateral
for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any person against
who he has a right of recourse.

The reason for the rule is well established:
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A guarantor of a note is secondarily
rather than primarily liable, and hence he is
released, under the express terms of the Negotiable Instruments Law, by any agreement
binding on the holder to extend the time of
payment. . . .
38 CJS Guaranty § 75a at p.
1241.
This Court has recently applied the doctrine, on facts parallel
to those at bar.

First National Bank v. Egbert, 663 P.2d 85 (Utah

1983) :
. . . The surety, then, can claim discharge
under [§] 3-606 when, without his consent and
without an 'express reservation of rights,1
the creditor and debtor enter into an agreement to extend time for payment.
*

*

*

Thus, by entering into an agreement extending
the time for payment . . . without the consent
of the sureties . . . and without an express
reservation of rights, even though it was not
required under the three prior notes, FNB discharged Mack and Cora Egbert of any further
liability under the first and second notes.
See U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-3-606 (1) (a). Id. at 87.
(Citations omitted.)
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that the rule discharging the guarantor in such circumstances is "strictissimi
juris," and that no inquiry into whether the guarantor is prejudiced is permitted.

Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp.,

485 F.Supp. 1355 (E.D. N.Y. 1980), accord, Balinger v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 381 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying New York law). In
the matter at bar the McDonalds were in fact damaged, and greviously so.

The trial court imposed judgment for $173,400 in

interest, all of which is attributable to extension of the time

2£/
for performance beyond the ten days the McDonalds agreed to.
^McDonalds agreed to a transaction that would close in 15 days, at the
most, and obligate them to only $288,000.00. See Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 70.

Had it not been for that extension, and had there been a prompt
foreclosure, it is even possible that Currierfs primary guarantee
would have avoided any recourse to the McDonalds at all.
The Memorandum Opinion dismisses these circumstances casually,
with the observation that "the evidence is undisputed that Defendant consented to all extensions afforded Currier and to the release of the collateral provided by others." (Mem. Op. 7.)

There

was no finding that Christenson reserved any rights against the
McDonalds, and in fact there was no reservation, and the trial
judge cited no evidence of a consent to the renegotiation that was
"undisputed", and in fact there is none.

The McDonalds never

agreed to the extension of the time for Currier's performance,
substitution of new deeds as security, or the increase in the
bonus.

To the contrary, the evidence is clear and undisputed that

the McDonalds were never even informed that it was being renegotiated until about a year later.
If the trial judge's reference was to the provisons of the
Trust Deed Note that the makers "consent to any and all extensions
of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted by
the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions
of this note" (see Appendix "A") that provision is of no avail.
Plainly, the provision relates only to modifications as between
Christenson and the McDonalds.

Any effort to extend that clause

to an obligation between Christenson and the primary obligor would
fail for the obvious reason that it was not, and in the nature of
things could not be, contemplated by the parties at the time of
the agreement.
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POINT V
Costs Awarded were Excessive and Improper
The trial court awarded attorneys1 fees to the Plaintiffs in
the sum of Forty-One Thousand Twenty-Two Dollars ($41,022.00) and
costs of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Dollars and 23 Cents
($2,818.23), which the McDonalds submit is excessive.
Plaintiffs1 counsel should not be awarded fees for duplicating
almost identical discovery that had been conducted prior to their
assuming representation of Plaintiffs and for making a Motion for
Summary Judgment which is nearly identical with the one prepared
and argued by their predecessor counsel.

That attorneys1 fees

awarded by the trial court represent a duplication of efforts by
prior counsel, who prepared the case for trial and prepared and
argued a substantially identical Motion for Summary Judgment to
Judge Judith Billings, who denied it, is evident from the two sets
of depositions which form the Record herein.

This Court has held

that deposition costs are taxable only if they were necessarily
incurred.

Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683

P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
At the time present counsel for Christenson assumed their
representation, the case was scheduled for trial and present counsel merely duplicated the efforts of their predecessors.

There

were no witnesses called to testify and the Summary Judgment
Motion was a nonevidentiary hearing.

No subpoena costs are there-

fore recoverable.
Costs awarded for secretarial overtime, for Lexis research,
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copying machine costs, long distance telephone calls or other
cost items are also improper.
CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to observe that Christenson, rather
than the McDonalds, actually caused the loss by its failure to
establish an escrow or apply the $288,000.00 to "closing costs"
on the Currier loan.

For the reasons indicated, that conduct

disregarded the duty of good faith and fair dealing between contracting parties, and amounted to a failure of consideration as
to the original promise of the McDonalds.

For those reasons, to-

gether with the further reason that Christenson1s subsequent
conduct amounted to a release of the McDonalds as Guarantors,
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the motion
of the McDonalds to dismiss and for summary judgment granted.
Respectfully submitted this J?7

day of y^Z^^n

, 1987.

-3**Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Glen M. Richman, Esq.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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(Conformed Copy)

A P P E N D I X

A
~~

TRUST DEED NOTE

> NOT NEGOTIATE THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be
surrendered to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

288,000.00

Salt Lake City, Utah
August 20

, 19 81

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the
•der of:
lECURITY FUNDING CORPORATION PENSION PLAN as to a 2/3 beneficial interest (contribution
1187,000.00) and to NEIL P. CHRISTENSON as to a 1/3 beneficial interest (contribution $101,000.
'WO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND & 00/100

DOLLARS ( $288,000.00 ) ,

jgether with interest from date at the rate of Twenty
per cent ( 2!£ %) per annum
I the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:
One or more payments with the full amount together with accrued interest
due and payable on or before November 20, 1981.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reiction of principal. Any such installment not paid when due shall bear interest there:
ter at the rate of
TWENTY
percent ( 20 %) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest
: any part thereof, or in the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust
ied securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand,
ly declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable.

If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal
: interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree
) pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment
:>r payment, demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to
iy and all extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted
{ the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and
:> the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

MCDONALD BROTHERS, INC.

By:
STEVENSON McDONALD, Pres.

* ^ ? H E N RECORDED, MAIL TO:

A P P E N D I X

fJ 3603657

{Ernst Jtafc

TWSTRUST DEED is made this

,19 81

August

2 0 t h dayof

,

,as Trustor,

between McDONALD BROTHERS, INC.
v/hose address is
(City)

(State)

BARRETT TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, as TRUSTEE, and
SECURITY FUNDUS CORPORATION & NEIL P. CHRISTENSON
** BENEflCIARY.
Trustor hereby EfiSJ^SARft) WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following
described property situated in
S a l t Lake
County, Utah:
Commencing 1760 f e e t East from t h e West q u a r t e r c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 1 6 ,
Township 3 S o u t h , Range 1 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian; t h e n c e Soutn
47* 06* East 6 3 4 . 3 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 80* 13* E a s t 400 f e e t ; t h e n c e North
500 f e e t more or l e s s to the c e n t e r of the South s e c t i o n , t h e n c e w e s t 880
f e e t to the beginning.

C

t
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and ail water rights, rights of way, easement*,, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date
herewith, in the principal sum of $ 2 8 8 , 0 0 0 • 00
» payable to the order ot Beneficiary at the
times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any sums expended or advanced by
Beneficiary to protect the security hereof.
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and assessments on watei
or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate hre insurance on improvements
on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event ot default in
ayment of the indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by
rustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof.)
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed
to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
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STATE OF UTAH
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BY.

STEVENSON McDONALD, Pres~ - ^ u 5 i ! i } , l #
[/4<tj*€*l
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,persorailyappe/r^wWw^\^

MCDONALD BROTHERS, INC. by STEVENSON McDONALD, P r e s .
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledges to me that ....he....
executed w
the same.
.ne.... executeu

/s?th&*gnerf.,^jjJJ
1 ^ • 5 ^ / C5 -^ 1

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
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